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Autonomous Capabilities for Small Unmanned Aerial Systems
Conducting Radiological Response: Findings from a High-fidelity
Discovery Experiment
Brittany A. Duncan and Robin R. Murphy
Center for Robot-Assisted Search and Rescue, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843
Abstract
This article presents a preliminary work domain theory and identifies autonomous vehicle, navigational, and
mission capabilities and challenges for small unmanned aerial systems (SUASs) responding to a radiological disaster.
Radiological events are representative of applications that involve flying at low altitudes and close proximities to
structures. To more formally understand the guidance and control demands, the environment in which the SUAS
has to function, and the expected missions, tasks, and strategies to respond to an incident, a discovery experiment
was performed in 2013. The experiment placed a radiological source emitting at 10 times background radiation in
the simulated collapse of a multistory hospital. Two SUASs, an AirRobot 100B and a Leptron Avenger, were inserted
with subject matter experts into the response, providing high operational fidelity. The SUASs were expected by the
responders to fly at altitudes between 0.3 and 30 m, and hover at 1.5 m from urban structures. The proximity to a
building introduced a decrease in GPS satellite coverage, challenging existing vehicle autonomy. Five new navigational
capabilities were identified: scan, obstacle avoidance, contour following, environment-aware return to home, andreturn
to highest reading. Furthermore, the data-to-decision process could be improved with autonomous data digestion and
visualization capabilities. This article is expected to contribute to a better understanding of autonomy in a SUAS, serve
as a requirement document for advanced autonomy, and illustrate how discovery experimentation serves as a design
tool for autonomous vehicles.
TexasA&MEngineering Extension Service’s Disaster City
® complex. Disaster City ® is a collection of buildings,
rubble, and trains accurately replicating damage to major
urban structures. The Summer Institute conducted high
fidelity concept experimentation with subject matter
experts (SMEs) from Texas Task Force 1 (TX-TF1), Texas
National Guard’s 6th Weapons of Mass Destruction
Civil Support Team (CST), and the Texas Commission
on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), which is the state
environmental protection agency. Experimenters hid a
Cesium-137 radiological source emitting at 10 times the
background radiation in a collapsed three-story building
to simulate a leak in a nuclear medicine ward in a major
hospital after an earthquake. Two different rotorcraft—a
single rotor 1.5 m helicopter and a micro quadrotor—
were used to fly missions at realistic standoff distances
and conditions, providing a diversity of UAS platforms.
An unmanned ground vehicle was used independently to
locate the source (Duckworth, Shrewsbury, and Murphy,
2013); however, that effort is beyond the scope of this
article.
A goal of the concept experimentation was to identify
the autonomous capabilities needed for a SUAS response
to a radiological event. In particular, the experimentation
addressed three questions:

1. Introduction
This article presents a preliminary work domain theory
(Vicente, 1999) and identifies autonomous capabilities
needed by small unmanned aerial systems (SUASs)
responding to a radiological disaster. As a work domain
theory is formative, that is, it captures the key elements of
a new tool or protocol, it contributes new questions and
environmental constraints for the research community,
prioritizes capabilities to be added by manufacturers,
and helps practitioners understand the current state of
the art of SUASs in near-Earth, low-altitude applications.
Radiological sensing requires SUASs to fly as close to the
source as possible because measurable radiation decreases
with the square of the distance, thus they must operate
at low altitudes and near structures. However, the only
known use of SUAVs for an actual radiological event was
the use of the Honeywell T-Hawk at the 2011 Fukushima
nuclear accident, and the autonomous capabilities of
the platform were not activated (Murphy, 2014). As a
result, there is no domain theory specifying the expected
guidance and control demands; the types of obstacles and
terrains that are associated with a radiological disaster;
the missions, flight paths, altitudes and proximities, and
general strategies for localizing the source of the radiation;
and the expected availability of GPS and wireless
connectivity.
This paper derives the work domain theory for
autonomy based on the 2013 Summer Institute held at the

What are the missions that SUASs will be expected
to conduct? What are are the tasks that comprise
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these missions and the strategies that SUASs can
use to accomplish them? What is the sociotechnical
organization of a radiological response and how does
that impact the need for, and types of, autonomous
capabilities?
This article uses the definition and categories of autonomy
from the recent Defense Science Board study on the role
of autonomy in Department of Defense systems (Murphy
and Shields, 2012). Following the study, autonomy is
viewed as a set of capabilities that enable the humanmachine system to accomplish a mission. Autonomous
capabilities for unmanned systems will generally fall
into one of three categories: vehicle autonomy, such as
hovering and healthmonitoring; navigational autonomy,
such as obstacle avoidance and path planning; and
mission autonomy, including situation awareness aids,
data digestion, and visualization.
The article is organized as follows. The relatively
small volume of related work in unmanned systems
for radiological events, either actual deployments or
simulations, is reviewed in Section 2. Background
information necessary for the understanding of the
remainder of the paper is presented in Section 3. Section
4 describes the 2013 Summer Institute, which hosted
the discovery experiment. This section describes the
discovery experiment process and how it is designed
to work with SMEs to identify new mission capabilities,
the staging of the experiment at Disaster City R_, the
propositions being explored, the robots used, and the
flights for each of the two missions. Section 5 reports
on the cognitive work analysis used to capture the
missions and operational envelope for the robots that
provide the ecology for autonomy, the tasks that could
be conducted autonomously and the strategies for those
tasks, and the sociotechnical organizational constraints
on autonomy. Section 6 discusses the implications for
autonomy in terms of the vehicle, navigational, and
mission autonomy, and the findings are summarized in
Section 7.
2. Related Work
The use of SUASs for radiological events has served as
motivation for papers exploring some aspect of UAS
swarms, such as maintaining wireless connectivity
(Goddemeier, Daniel, and Wietfeld, 2012) or tracking
a moving radiological source (Ristic, Morelande,
Gunatilaka, and Rutten, 2007). It appears that only
one SUAS has been engaged in an actual response to
such an event, namely the Fukushima nuclear accident.
Two theoretical papers project tasks and human-robot
interaction that will be confirmed by the Summer
Institute. Together the prior work suggests three tasks:
radiological survey, radiation source localization, and
perimeter detection.

of

F i e l d R o b o t i c s (2014)

The only known use of a SUAS for an actual
radiological event was at the 2011 Fukushima nuclear
accident (Murphy, 2014). Two Honeywell T-Hawk
unmanned aerial vehicles were used for approximately
40 missions from April 10, 2011, to the end of July, 2011,
in order to conduct radiological surveys, visual damage
assessment for structural integrity monitoring, and
debris removal forecasts. The longest flightwas about 1.6
km oneway.While theUAV use is considered sensitive
information and has not been published by the Tokyo
Electric Company, some details have been released
or were recorded by Murphy, who designed the team
protocols. The T-Hawk is a ducted fan weighing 8 kg
without fuel. It has a range of up to 10kmand a speed of
20.5 m/s (40 knots) with an endurance of up to 50 min.
The T-Hawk has a camera and forward-looking infrared
(FLIR) payload but no radiological sensor. Instead, a
small gamma dosimeter was attached and matched to the
vehicle’s GPS location for given time stamps. The robot
had vehicle and navigational autonomy capabilities,
but it relied heavily on human-robot teaming. The
Honeywell pilots turned the autonomy off so as to be
sure that they were aware of all commands being given
to the robot, and thus any deviations from commanded
position would be due to the wind or radiologically
induced degradation of the system. The primary tasks
were visual and radiological surveys, where the T-Hawk
flew over the four reactor buildings at a fixed altitude and
at one point hovered within a plume of smoke expected
to be laden with radioactive particles. The initial survey
showed that the projected radiation was less in some
areas than expected, so that the SUAS team was allowed
to move the SUAS heliport closer to the reactor buildings.
The work on human swarm intelligence by Bashyal
and Venayagamoorthy (Bashyal and Venayagamoorthy,
2008) simulates a radiological event in MATLAB and
has two attributes that relate to findings from the
Summer Institute. It proposes human-machine teaming,
or human-robot interaction, where the user guides
the swarm to areas of interest, rather than relying on
all aspects of a flight being autonomous, from path
planning to navigation. It also explores a particle swarm
optimization algorithm for radiation source localization,
where the PSO creates a dense radiological map from
which a human can then visually extract the location of
highest radiation.
Clark and Fierro (2005) frame radiological detection
as a perimeter detection task, not as a radiation source
localization task, for a set of unmanned ground vehicles.
As will be discussed later, the Summer Institute exercise
saw the responders use one of the SUAVs for an initial
perimeter detection followed by a survey within the
perimeter within the same flight.
Typical applications of chemical plume or pollution
monitoring have historically been seen as either a
single robot, single task application, as in Russell,
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Thiel, Devesa, andMackay-Sim (1995) and Ishida,
Nakayama, Nakamoto, and Moriizumi (2005), or a
swarm application, single task, as in Zarzhitsky, Spears,
and Spears (2005). In contrast, this exercise considers the
need for the robot to be used for multiple tasks, including
initial reconnaissance, source detection, and source
localization. A nuclear forensics scenario also assumes
the need for quick assessment, rather than a loiter-andobserve approach as in monitoring applications.
3. Summer Institute
The 2013 Emergency Informatics Summer Institute, June
4–7, 2013, was the fifth held by Texas A&M, though the
concept originated with Murphy in Murphy (2004),
Gage, Murphy, and Minten (2004), and Murphy, Burke,
and Stover (2006), and it was held annually at different
locations until 2009. The Summer Institute approach
to bringing together practitioners, researchers, and
industry in high-fidelity exercises to foster and document
innovation was formalized byWoods inWoods and
Hollnagel (2006). The research objective of the Summer
Institute is to conduct discovery experimentation.
Discovery experimentation is a phase in a concept
experimentation campaign (Alberts and Hayes, 2002) to
create a newmission capability that can be adopted by
the end user. Discovery experimentation is conducted
in the highest possible physical and operational
fidelity with SMEs in order to establish the reliability
of the technology and the human-machine system
performance. The radiological experiment simulated

3

the collapse of a hospital with a large nuclear medicine
wing from an earthquake. The intent was to examine
technologies that could (i) speed up the initial survey of
the level of radiation in the area and (ii) locate the nuclear
material (also known as nuclear forensics) while (iii)
reducing human exposure to radiation. The discovery
experimentation process and the manual process, which
serve as the baseline, are described in more detail below.
3.1. Discovery Experimentation Process
The Summer Institute discovery experimentation
process is shown in Figure 1. The ultimate goal is to
innovate new complete mission capabilities; this means
not just verifying that a technology works but that the
system fits the missions needed by the end users and
their operational, ergonomic, and training constraints.
The process has three phases: screening an innovation(s)
to determine if it has sufficient technical maturity and
fits the requirements of the desired missions, conducting
the discovery experiment itself with sufficient physical
and concept-of-operations fidelity to test propositions
using data collected in the field, and analyzing the data
to determine how the technology can be refined to meet
a suitable mission as well as identify any hardware or
software technology gaps, any systems gaps leading
to barriers in the data-to-decision (D2D) process, or
cognitive barriers using cognitive work analysis (CWA).
The result of the analysis phase is a determination
of whether some technologies are not suitable for
radiological response and thus manufacturers should
not invest in pursuing a nonexistent market; identifying

4

if a technology is sufficiently mature and capable that
it could be immediately adopted with minor upgrades,
use doctrines, and training for early adopters; detecting
system performance barriers and generating new
methods or metrics to better capture these in the field;
and uncovering new research questions.
The discovery experimentation process for 2013 started
in December 2012 when subject matter experts from
the Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service (TEEX)
identified a radiological response mission capability to
be of interest. The SMEs provided a basic scenario and
a list of technology requirements. Using that scenario
and list, the Center for Emergency Informatics (CEI) and
the General Dynamics EDGER _ industry consortium
circulated calls for participation for unmanned systems,
sensors, and D2D and situation awareness software.
The screening phase began in March of 2013, when the
SMEs reviewed the candidate technologies and selected
a subset based on how well the technologiesmatched the
mission requirements (e.g., needed verification) or offered
an interesting capability (e.g., needed exploration). The
SMEs selected three SUASs, though only two could
participate, as well as several ground vehicles, sensors,
wireless repeaters, and software packages. Note that
discovery experimentation is not an inclusive event
because not all technologies are sufficiently mature to
participate in a high-fidelity situation, the interest by the
responders does not apply equally to all innovations,
and because the data collection process must be tailored
to the devices or packages. Of the three invited SUASs,
two committed to participation, as participants were
required to cover their own costs.
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The experimental phase began at the same time as
the requests for participation and invitations were being
extended. The CEI team created a set of propositions
to guide the construction of a data collection plan that
would capture both the physical performance and the
general cognitive system performance and bottlenecks.
Technologies with data logging capabilities were
integrated into the RESPOND-R test instrument whenever
possible for centralized data collection. The RESPOND-R
test instrument is a logging platform for robotic and
cyber-physical systems used in emergency response
(Shrewsbury,Henkel, Kim, and Murphy, 2013). It acquires
sensor data from agents in the field and relays real-time
information to listening parties for logging and analysis.
RESPOND-R data management includes archival data
propagation, classification, and visualizations. The
RESPOND-R framework was developed on top of the
Robot Operating System (ROS) and is currently integrated
with the iRobot Packbot 510, AirRobot 100B, and the
AEOS Marcy as well as stand-alone sensors, including
the Davis Vantage Vue weather station, Canberra Radiac
Geiger Counter, and RAE Systems PPBRAE.
The analysis step of the discovery experiment in Figure
1 is ongoing; this article reflects the technological gaps
and the CWA of the data collected with the SUAS with
respect to autonomy.
3.2. Manual Radiological Surveys and Forensics
Radiological surveys and forensics have traditionally
been conducted by a team of six human specialists: two
in Level A suits to enter the hot zone carrying radiological
and gas sensors, as shown in Figure 2, two in Level A suits
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in reserve to rescue the two down range if necessary, and
two to assist with donning the gear and decontamination
when they return. It takes on the order of 1 h to set up the
decontamination system, don the gear, and enter the hot
zone for the assessment. Typically, the responders do not
report observations in real time, so it is on the order of
45–60 min before they return with radiological readings
and a verbal assessment of the situation. Furthermore,
the density of sensor readings and the quality of the
assessment may be hampered by the protective suits, as
the plastic suits restrict mobility and visibility. As seen in
Figure 2, the down range team literally has their hands
full with sensors and cannot manage a camcorder, thus
a SUAS with a suitable payload could provide real-time,
dense sampling.
The concept of operations is that two suited responders
would first approach a damaged building with a potential
radiation hazard to make an initial assessment of the
situation. If radiation is present, they would then follow
up by localizing the radiological source. The initial
assessment of the situation determines how far the scene
extends, what buildings are involved, and whether there
is any imminent danger, such as from radiation or gas
leaks. The responders would prefer to have Google Earth
or other satellite images of the incident to help plan the
down range activities, but these images are at best days
old and give no indication about the current scene, thus
SUASs are an attractive option for obtaining actionable
overhead imagery. If a radiological source was confirmed
during the initial assessment, it would need to be located
and mitigated in order for the rest of the response to move
forward. Throughout all missions in a response, the most
important rule is to be as accurate as possible because
inaccurate information can cost time and resources, or
worse, put lives at risk.
4. Experiments
The propositions for the 2013 Summer Institute were
based on the gaps observed in the 2012 Summer Institute,
which focused on a chemical train derailment (Duncan
and Murphy, 2013), illustrating the feedback loop of
“refine discovery experimentation” in Figure 1. The
expectations for the use of SUASs for a radiological event
were as follows:
·
·
·

missions would be conducted faster with SUASs
than manual inspection,
vehicle and navigational autonomy would be
challenging due to low altitude flights and proximity to urban structures,
the D2D process would experience bottlenecks,
and as a result mission autonomy capabilities
needed to overcome these bottlenecks would be
identified.

5

The radiological discovery experiment had five steps.
The familiarization step was held on June 4, 2013, where
the SMEs had hands-on interaction with the technologies
corresponding to basic awareness training; this basic level
of training is consistent with how a new technology would
be introduced ad hoc to the Public Safety community
before more detailed and formal training occurred after
purchasing the equipment. The second step, which
occurred on the morning of June 6, was a table-top exercise
style walk-through of a typical radiological response
conducted by representatives of local, state, and federal
agencies that would be responsible for responding to a
radiological event to describe the response process, as it
would likely be conducted by a group of researchers and
industry representatives. The third step, which occurred
on the afternoon of June 6, was to simulate the insertion
of the technology into a response, where the technology
teams had to report to the Incident Commander, be
assigned to a responder team, were given a location
and mission, and then were allowed to enter the warm
zone, which is the area identified by the safety officers
to be off limits to personnel not actively involved in the
response. In addition, a trained human-machine system
observer accompanied the responder team. The insertion
maintained a high degree of operational fidelity, where the
SUASs were being used and directed by responders as if
it were a real response with safety procedures, stand-off
distances, radios, and communication protocols followed.
The response continued until the mission objectives were
met, though in prior Summer Institutes, some events ended
without meeting the objectives when it became obvious
that a technology could not accomplish the goal; unlike
Advanced Technology Concept Demonstrations used
by the military, which try to ensure that the technology
succeeds and will retry or adapt to the scenario, discovery
experimentation accepts mission failure as a valuable data
point. The fourth preliminary feedback step concluded
with a “hot wash” or preliminary after-action report
immediately following the simulated response. The fifth
step was a broader, facilitated after action review (AAR)
conducted on the morning of June 7. The data collection
team produced a preliminary synthesis of the results
from data collection, and the SMEs worked on their
observations overnight.
4.1. Staging of the Discovery Experiment
The experiment was staged around Building 133 at TEEX’s
Disaster City R _ complex, which is in Class D airspace.
The prop is a simulated building collapse capturing the
key attributes of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building,
which was destroyed in the Oklahoma City Bombing. It
is a three-story concrete building with rooms filled with
office furniture, an attached parking garage collapsed
onto cars, and a dense rubble pile on one side. The
prop provides the same materials, construction style,
and furnishings that multistory commercial buildings
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would contain and that would absorb radiation. A “hot”
radiological source, Cesium-137, emitting at 10 times the
level of background radiation levels was placed in an
interior room on the first floor (see Figure 3).
Two platforms were used, namely an AirRobot 100B
owned and operated by the Center for Robot-Assisted
Search and Rescue, and a Leptron Avenger owned and
operated by Leptron.
·

The AirRobot 100B (AirRobot, 2007), shown in
Figure 4, is a quadrotor commonly used by the
U.S. Army, and it is representative of the typical interfaces and data acquisition capabilities of
small multi-rotor UASs. It has a single wire ring
that protects the rotors from damage in a light
collision. The AirRobot carried only a video or
thermal imaging payload. TheAirRobot has autonomous waypoint navigation and return-toposition behaviors, but these were not used because the mission specialists wanted to see and
direct in real time.AGammaPix radiation detector on a cell phone was considered as a payload,
but the sensitivity of the sensor was too low to be
of value and thus it was not used in this study.
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The Center for Robot-Assisted Search and Rescue has now developed a radiological payload
for this vehicle which holds both a camera and
a Personal Radiation Detector and will test this
payload at theWinter Institute in November
2013.
·

The Leptron Avenger (Leptron, 2013), shown in
Figure 4, is a single-rotor system based on a TREX frame commonly used by law enforcement,
and it features the capabilities of a larger system
with heavier payload capabilities. The Avenger
had the ability to either be flown by the pilot’s
hand controller or to plot flights via a ground
control laptop to specify both a path and specific
points of interest at a given altitude. It was modified to carry a Thermo Scientific RadEye PRDER High-Sensitivity Personal Radiation Detector
(Scientific, 2013) supplied by the CST and taped
to its airframe upside down to get a better reading. Due to the fact that the RadEye did not have
a logging function, the onboard camera was used
to monitor the readings, which required the pilot to fly heads up and sacrificed any visual data
about the incident when monitoring the sensor.
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The SMEs participating in the experiment were hazardous
material specialists from TX-TF1 and the Texas National
Guard’s CST, both of which would be expected to send
personnel to directly approach, localize, and mitigate the
radiological incident, and TCEQ, which would respond to
and assist in mitigation and recovery from a radiological
event.
4.2. Missions
The team was assigned two missions by the incident
commander: first an initial assessment followed by a
request for radiological source localization. The SUASs
were able to survey the incident and localize the source
in two flights. Since there were two SUASs, each flew the
same mission, for a total of four flights, though as will be
discussed in Section 5, the difference in platforms led to
different strategies. Table I summarizes the flights. All
flights were conducted in line of sight and teleoperated.
The SUASs did not fly through radioactive dust or
materials, so the they did not have to be decontaminated.
Since the team worked from the warm zone and did not
handle a contaminated robot, they did not have to wear
protective gear.
The UAV team was made up of three members
following the concept of operations established in Pratt,
Murphy, Stover, and Griffin (2009) and used for responses
in Italy (Kruijff et al., 2012) and Cyprus (Angermann,
Frassl, and Lichtenstern, 2012): a Pilot, a Safety Observer,
and a Mission Specialist. The Pilot-in-Command of all
flights was a licensed private pilot, as required by the FAA,
but the primary Pilot for a given platform was determined
by the amount of time accumulated flying that robot. The
mission specialist, who was the responder in charge of
the mission, directed the pilot and communicated with
the Incident Command staff via a radio. On AirRobot
flight one and Avenger flight two, two responders acted
as mission specialists, though in a real deployment there
most likely would have been oneMission Specialist to
keep the team size as small as possible. The mission
specialists rotated out with one from TCEQ, primary on
Avenger flight two, and one from CST, primary on both
AirRobot flights and Avenger flight one. The safety officer
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was a CRASAR SUAS specialist, either Tanner Perkins or
Robin Murphy, trained for the position and concerned
with airspace and responders or ground robots working
beneath the SUAS, vehicle safety, and team safety. The
Pilot was Brittany Duncan for the AirRobot and Scott
Heath was the Avenger Pilot.
Data from the SUAS were collected and archived
using the RESPOND-R test instrument. The data from
each SUAS were robot-eye video recorded by the SUAS,
flight data recorded by the SUAS, and time stamps of
the data. In addition, the flight logs filled in by the SUAS
team, observational logs of the SUAS team activities, and
observational logs of the incident command activities
were collected.
4.2.1. Mission 1: Initial Assessment
The SUAS team was tasked to leave the Base of Operations
and enter the “warm zone, ”maintaining a standoff
distance of 125 m (410 ft) from the source. Staging Area 1
corresponded to the same standoff distance for a manual
team. For a map of the warm and hot zones, refer to Figure
5. Due to line-of-sight limitations on the SUAVs, the team
chose to set up at the intersection of two roads just outside
of the warm zone. The team was approximately 500 m
from the Base of Operations without reliable wireless
connectivity either through a local MANET or cellular
service. The time from arriving at Staging Area 1 to the
first SUAS in the air was 16 min.
The AirRobot flew the first flight, and completed a
visual inspection of the building by flying to the middle
of the incident and completing two 360 degree rotations
while getting complete coverage with a 10 megapixel still
camera, then flying around to get pictures of all sides of
the building.
The Avenger flew the second flight and completed
a visual inspection by flying around the exterior of the
incident switching between FLIR and high-resolution
video, then it conducted a radiological survey with the
RadEye sensor to confirm the presence of a radiological
source. The mission specialist directed the flight and
reported higher radiological readings to incident
command after landing.
After each flight, the mission specialist(s) prioritized
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Figure 5. A map showing the “warm zone” and “hot zone” distances in the Summer Institute Exercise in reference to the “hospital
collapse” (1), first staging area (2), second staging area (3), and Incident Command (4).

the still pictures and videos from the flights to be sent
to incident command so that it could be triaged when it
arrived. Data for the incident commander were sent via
thumb drive by having a data manager walk or drive it
to the command post. The thumb drive with the photos
from flight 1 was available 14 min after landing and
took an additional 8 min to transport to command, so it
was delivered 22 min after landing. Video from flight 1
was sent with the video and picture data from flight 2.
This thumb drive was available 4 min after landing and
arrived at command 5 min later, so it was delivered 9
min after landing.
The outcomes of the first mission were as follows:
1) the extent of the physical damage was captured
visually, and
2) the radiation was determined to be less than expected
and thus the warm zone boundaries were decreased.
4.3. Mission 2: Radiation Source Localization
After completing Mission 1, the SUAS team was directed
to conduct a radiation source localization mission, but

were allowed to move closer to the incident and launch
from Staging Area 2.
The Avenger flew the third flight while providing
real-time data from the RadEye sensor in order to locate
the source and confirm on what floor of the building it
was located. The mission specialist guided the flight and
used the secondary mission specialist to call the highest
readings to incident command during the flight. After the
flight, the highest reading was confirmed with incident
command, along with its approximate location on the
front of the building. The mission specialist essentially
used a “greedy search” by following the increasing
readings and avoiding the decreasing readings to direct
the pilot to fly to the highest readings.
The AirRobot flew the fourth flight to simulate a
radiological source localization with a closer proximity
to the building and the ability to scan the front of the
building in a more organized fashion due to the hoop
protecting the blades. After this scan was complete,
the AirRobot was tasked to complete a more thorough
visual inspection to try to locate a picture of the source
if possible.
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The outcome of the second mission was a determination
that the source was on the first floor, but no visual of the
source was captured. As in Mission 1, still photos and
videos were recorded to a thumb drive and delivered by
the data manager to the incident commander. The data
from flight 3 were available 24 min after the flight and
took 9 min to walk to command, so they were delivered
33 min after landing. Flight 4 sent the data 5min after
landing, and they arrived 6 min later for a total of 11 min
after landing.
5. Cognitive Work Analysis
A CWA (Vicente, 1999) was conducted on the data
gathered by the discovery experiment in order to establish
the preliminary domain theory and to determine if
the propositions in Section 4 were supported. CWA
is a tool for understanding a formative domain, one
where an innovation has the potential to change or
eliminate existing tasks. It was used to create SUAS crew
organization and protocols from flights after Hurricane
Katrina in 2005 (Pratt et al., 2009); the resulting concept
of operations was used at the 2011 Fukushima nuclear
accident, the 2011 Cyprus explosion (Angermann
et al., 2012), and the 2012 Finale Emilia earthquake
(Kruijff et al., 2012). CWA consists of five components:
a work domain analysis, which models what SUASs are
expected to do and the conditions or constraints under
which they operate, control task analysis and strategies
analysis, which identify the specific, reoccurring tasks
in the domain that must be done (control tasks) and
how they are done (strategies), and social organization
and cooperation analysis and worker competencies
analysis, which capture the sociotechnical factors that
can influence the acceptability of autonomy. Of these, the
control task and strategies analyses are the most critical
for identifying specific autonomous capabilities because
they represent specific desirable capabilities that are
candidates for autonomy.
5.1. Work Domain
The discovery experiment suggests that the work
domain will benefit from the introduction of SUASs
overall as SUASs will reduce the number of responders
and accelerate data gathering. The overall missions,
work flow, and location of the team will remain the same
and the general time associated with getting the initial
set of information will be decreased by 53%, but though
there will be imagery added to the data-to-decision
process, the process itself will remain unchanged. The
introduction of a SUAS raises the question of how it
will be decontaminated or maintained between flights.
Furthermore, the personnel protection equipment makes
it impractical to manually extract a SD card from a
SUAS or perform other complex manipulations such as
changing batteries.
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The missions, work flow, and location of personnel
appear to be the same. Both a manual and a SUAS
team would conduct the same two missions: initial
assessment and radiation source localization. Note that
the perimeter detection mission proposed in the research
literature (Clark and Fierro, 2005) appears to be a task
within the initial assessment mission, not a distinctly
separate mission. There is a possibility that a SUAS could
conduct both missions in one flight, though the results
of the initial assessment may allow the team to move
the helispot closer for a more conducive line of sight for
performing the localization mission. Both types of teams
would have access to the same types of information prior
to the missions (e.g., Google Earth maps) and the same
reporting requirements. The entry/collection point at
the warm zone for both teams would be on the order of
125–300 m from the presumed area of interest for a small
incident, though for the Fukushima nuclear incident the
helispot was within the hot zone and on the order of
1–1.6 km from the reactor buildings.
ASUAS could reduce the number of responders
needed for a mission from six to three and, under ideal
conditions, reduce the number exposed to radiation from
two to zero. A manual team requires six responders: two
in Level A suits to enter the hot zone, two in Level A suits
in reserve to rescue the two downrange if necessary, and
two to assist with donning the gear and decontamination
on return. A SUAS eliminates the need for the two
downrange and the two in reserve, assuming that the
SUAS does not need to be retrieved and decontaminated
by a suited responder. As described in Section 4, a SUAS
team consists of three members.
A SUAS can accelerate the acquisition of actionable
data and possibly provide higher-quality data. The first
flight of a SUAS during the experiment occurred 16 min
after the team arrived at the helispot, with the mission
specialist beginning to make radio observations to
the Incident Commander at 50 min after arrival, 2 min
after the second flight landed, to let command know
that radiation levels were elevated over the southern
part of the collapse. A manual team would take on the
order of 1 h to set up the decontamination system, don
the gear, and enter the hot zone (see Figure 2). Typically,
the responders do not report observations in real time,
so it is on the order of 45– 60 min before they return
with radiological readings and a verbal assessment of
the situation. However, the density of sensor readings
and the quality of the assessment may be hampered by
the protective suits, as the plastic suits restrict mobility
and visibility. As seen in Figure 2, the downrange team
literally has their hands full with sensors and cannot
manage a camcorder. The recorded imagery from a SUAS
may be of greater overall utility.
While a SUAS can in theory provide significant
benefits to a radiological response, current SUASs may
have to be redesigned in order to be adopted. The major
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issue is decontamination of the SUAS. If the SUAS cannot
be decontaminated, it can remain in the hot zone but will
require a responder in personal protective equipment
(PPE) to enter, recharge it, replace any recording media,
etc. The responder must then be decontaminated,
etc., increasing the manpower needs and logistics tail.
The ergonomics of manipulating a SUAS in PPE may
influence the system design. A secondary issue for SUAS
adoption is possible susceptibility to radiation, however
this was not seen at Fukushima.
5.2. Control Task and Strategies Analysis
The initial assessment is generally accomplished by
getting as much information as possible from both a
visual scan and a limited amount of sensor data, such as
radiological and gas readings. If possible, these would
be conducted at the same time, and data from all sensors
would be recorded. As a side effect of the radiological
survey, the perimeter detection task should be completed
and may allow for a reduction in the hot zone and warm
zone areas. After the mission, it would be preferable to
be able to cue up a full playback of the mission, including
the telemetry, video, and sensor data at any given point in
the flight. Additionally, GPS tagging on all data (images,
sensor readings) is necessary for them to be valuable to
the overall operations at incident command.
5.2.1. Initial Assessment Mission
The initial assessment mission is characterized as
generally providing comprehensive visual coverage
from a low altitude, 22–40 m. The altitude appears to be a
function of the desired view, where higher gives a wider
view, and the height of the structures. However, these
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altitudes appear too high for a useful radiological survey
and just indicate the presence of radiation. The two
strategies were a formal strategy for ensuring coverage
of the visual imagery and an ad hoc clockwise sweep.
The strategy used by the AirRobot for the mission
(Air- Robot Flight 1) had two steps. First, the pilot
flew the SUAS to what appeared to be the middle of
the incident area and took 17 pictures in a 360 degree
pattern (eight pictures each at 60 and 30 degree camera
tilt angles and one looking straight down) in order to get
overlapping images that provided full coverage of the
rubble pile and the building. The collection of images
would be suitable for tiling into a master image or for
a reconstruction program such as photosynth. While
an automated process for this exists on the AirRobot
platform, it was not used at this time in order to allow
the mission specialist to pause the process if a point of
interest was identified. The pilot then continued around
the building to get pictures of all four sides, similar to
elevation views. The flight path is not shown.
The strategy used by the Avenger for the mission
was for the pilot to fly a clockwise sweep around the
area of interest; this was approximately the first 3 min
of Avenger Flight 1. The flight path for the entire flight is
shown in Figure 6.
5.2.2. Radiation Localization Mission
The radiation localization mission is characterized by
extremely low altitude flights (0.3 m) in close proximity
to structures (1.5 m) and terrain (1.5 m). The actual
strategies used for the Avenger and AirRobot were
different due to the differences in their design. The
Avenger used a greedy search around the front face
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of the building with a standoff distance of 3m, while
the AirRobot used a horizontal raster scan from top to
bottom with a standoff distance of 1.5 m. In the AirRobot
flight, the mission specialist intervened to direct the
robot to opportunistically gather information. While
the mission specialist did not offer a strategy for the
initial assessment mission, there appeared to be strong
opinions on how to accomplish the radiation localization
mission. For a multistory building, either a horizontal
or vertical raster scan of each face of the structure (see
Figure 7) is desired by the SMEs to provide repeatability
and complete radiological coverage. However, the SME
did not give quantitative sensing requirements, and it
is possible that any strategy that provided a sufficient
survey would be acceptable. Additionally, a request was
made for either of the SUAS platforms to complete a
scan over the rubble pile at 1.5 m to verify that there was
not another source in the rubble. Due to the low altitude
requested and the variability of the pile, both pilots and
safety officers declined.
The Avenger conducted a radiation localization
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mission as the later portion of its Flight 1 and then as a
dedicated Flight 2. For the later portion of Flight 1, the
strategy was a raster scan at a constant altitude. The pilot
directed the Avenger in a raster scan over the two-story
building at a constant altitude of 16 m while avoiding the
gantry (see Figure 8). The flight path for Avenger Flight
1 shown in Figure 6 suggests that the raster scan was
not uniform, but transitioned into a lower altitude scan
(6 m) in front of the building after an initial high sensor
reading.
The Avenger on Flight 2 used a greedy search, with
the flight path shown in Figure 9. It was reconfigured to
direct its video camera to the display for the radiological
sensor, forcing the pilot to fly heads up but allowing the
mission specialist to see the radiation readings in real
time. The ability to fly heads up was possible because
the team had moved to StagingArea 2 when the warm
zone was reduced. As the Avenger flew in a horizontal
scan from the top of the building to almost landing (0.3
m minimum altitude), the mission specialist called out
radiation readings and the pilot began to fly to maximize
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the value. The Avenger attempted to stay around 3 m
off the structure, balancing wind gusts, GPS shadows,
and the possibility of a collision with the sensitivity of
the sensors to radiation based on distance. The greedy
search algorithm was hampered by the inability of either
the pilot or the mission specialist to remember where the
highest readings were taken. This increased the cognitive
workload of the pilot and the mission specialist. The
pilot had to attempt to associate readings with locations
while flying, while the mission specialist had to look up
to see the location of the robot, then back down to the
sensor display.
The AirRobot conducted a simulated radiation
localization mission on Flight 2, shown in Figure 10, as
it did not have a radiological payload. For this flight,
the AirRobot attempted a horizontal scan over the front
of the building with instructions to get “as close as
possible,” which translated in practice to a 1.5 m standoff
distance. The AirRobot was able to operate closer to the
structure because of the wire safety hoop. During the
course of the flight, the mission specialist interrupted the
raster scan to take pictures through the windows to see if
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any other visual information could be gained. After the
conclusion of the pattern to the satisfaction of the SMEs,
it was requested that the AirRobot fly close to the top of
the building to see if it was possible to spot the source
through the grates of the building’s ceiling, and finally to
see if the source could be seen by looking in the doorway
on the side of the building closest to the pilot.
5.3. Social Organization and Cooperation Analysis and
Workers Competencies
The social organization and cooperation analysis and
the assessment of workers competencies provide insight
into the expectations for autonomous capabilities and
how autonomy might best complement the responders’
skills and interests. The control tasks and strategies
analyses suggest a high degree of vehicle and navigation
autonomy, while the user-oriented analysis (i) confirms
the need for autonomy to complement the demanding
flight regimes (e.g., vehicle and navigational autonomy)
and (ii) suggests that autonomous data processing (e.g.,
mission autonomy) is a valuable capability.
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The social organization and cooperation analysis
showed, not surprisingly, a hierarchical command and
data to decision process, where the SUAS team provides
their superior with relevant data. For both robots, the
data digestion process consisted of copying imagery and
geotagged stills to a USB drive. There was no indication
that a USB drive with 2.2 GB of data was viewed, as the
incident command staff would have had to sort through
the files. Data digestion in the field by the SUAS team can
be difficult. The radiation data were not georeferenced,
and, as with Fukushima, would have had to be manually
aligned with the GPS location of the platform for the
time stamp of the radiation data. The SMEs wanted the
radiation readings placed on an image of the incident
as the most useful visualization. To provide this level of
data digestion manually, the SUAS team would have to
be expanded to add another member or one of the team
members would need to acquire a new role.
The SMEs treated the missions as remote presence
tasks, not taskable agent tasks (Murphy and Burke, 2008);
they expected to direct the robot and essentially use it as
an extension of themselves into the remote area of interest.
This suggests that shared control between the pilot and
mission specialist (“ok, you point it where you want to
look”), with the robot providing guarded motion, may be
of value. It is unlikely that for the foreseeable future the
responders will have team members who can be diverted
for training as a pilot, especially formissions that require
low altitude, close proximity flights. This places greater
demands on reliable autonomous capabilities to reduce
the training load and to reduce any chance of failure, as
the robot will likely crash.
6. Implications for Autonomy
The discovery experimentation provides both a
preliminary domain theory for the use of a SUAS for
radiological response and, by extension, for near earth,
low altitude, close proximity flights in terms of vehicle,
navigational, and mission autonomy.
6.1. Domain Theory for Radiological Events
The discovery experiment indicates that a radiological
event will place severe demands on guidance and
control. To locate a radiation source, whose strength
decreases as the square of the distance, SUASs will
have to fly within 1.5 m of the ground surface (altitude)
and structures (proximity). The terrains and structures
may have been damaged in an earthquake or collapses,
modified, or have cranes, scaffolding, vegetation,
banners, power lines, or other unmodeled obstacles. The
urban structures may interfere with GPS, as the AirRobot
often dropped from 12 to 7 satellites and reported
higher altitude than videotapes indicated it was flying.
The experiment also provided insight into the types of
obstacles, such as construction equipment and debris
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as well as trees and vegetation, and the terrain, such as
irregular rubble varying 3 m in height. SUASs can reduce
responder exposure, acquire data more quickly for initial
assessment, and provide a more comprehensive and
complete radiological survey. The types of flight paths
needed are primarily for assessment and surveying
the damage, which lend themselves to autonomy, but
responders will need to opportunistically direct the robot
to inspect conditions.
6.2. Vehicle Autonomy
Vehicle autonomy will have to include low cost
exteroceptive sensing such as optical flow or radar to
provide position-hold flight control, rather than relying
on GPS and barometric pressure. While most SUASs
now have joy-stick neutral flight control, it is not clear
how reliable an implementation will be when the robot
is expected to be 1.5 m in altitude and 1.5 m from an
urban structure. The loss of GPS position information
is a strong possibility, with the SUAS operating within
the error range of GPS and barometers, making them
particularly susceptible to wind gusts near buildings.
6.3. Navigational Autonomy
Navigational autonomy in SUASs have focused on
waypoint navigation where the pilot enters GPS
waypoints or taps locations on a map. The discovery
experiment suggests that five other autonomous
capabilities will be more valuable for a radiological
response operating with 1.5 m of structures and at
altitudes between 0.3 and 30 m: scan, obstacle avoidance,
contour following, environment-aware return to home,
and return to highest reading. Two of these, obstacle
avoidance and environment-aware return to home,
should be valuable for any near earth, low altitude
application.
Scan. The two SUASs had waypoint navigation that
was well suited for flying above the tree line or above
structures, but waypoint navigation was not helpful for
initial assessment, which is based around the team seeing
the area of interest and then applying a scan algorithm to
provide visual coverage, which could be autonomous.
Scan algorithms are important to ensure full coverage and
to limit the amount of interruption to a task that needs to
be completed (e.g., tasking the pilot to look at structural
issues when a radiological scan is needed). During
this exercise, the control tasks and strategies analysis
identified four scan algorithms: a 360◦ sweep from the
epicenter of the area of interest, a horizontal (constant
altitude) raster at 32 m above the incident, a horizontal
raster along the face of a building, and a greedy search
where the goal was to gain the highest radiation reading;
this leads to a recommendation that SUASs be sold with
multiple full-coverage algorithms to choose from based
on the incident type and weather conditions.
Obstacle avoidance. The operational envelope for the
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SUAS will be from a 1.5 to 3 m horizontal distance, and
it will need both the ability for guarded motion if being
controlled manually, or full autonomy if completing a
scan. This autonomy will enable faster and more accurate
scans, but it will need to be resilient to holes in buildings
or rubble and other unmodeled obstacles, such as those
shown in Figure 8.
Contour following. Contour following of complex
rubble at an altitude of 1.5 m in order to detect radiation
buried in a collapsed structure was repeatedly requested,
but not performed due to the high risk of an accident.
Contour following is distinct from scan, which has at least
one plane (horizontal or vertical) that is free of obstacles.
In addition to the irregularity of the terrain, the platform
should also be able to update its own altitude even if it
was launched from a point of higher elevation than the
flight area, since pilots will often set their base station
uphill from the intended flight path in order to maintain
a better line-of-sight at lower altitudes.
Environment-aware return to home. Both SUASs
had return-to-home upon loss of signal capabilities, but
these were not designed for cluttered environments. The
Air- Robot procedure is to return to the highest altitude
during the entire flight and then fly directly to home and
autoland. However, if the robot were under the crane or
an outcropping of a damaged building, it might collide.
Return to the Highest Reading. Several SUASs
now offer autonomous return to a preset location and
viewpoint; this capability would autonomously analyze
the incoming radiological readings during a scan and then
return to the location where the highest reading occurred.
This would eliminate the greedy search algorithm used
in Avenger Flight 2, which did not produce a uniform
radiological survey nor was it guaranteed to have the
global maximum radiation reading.
6.4. Mission Autonomy
The most desired autonomous mission capability was
not mission planning (e.g., what platform to use and
what flight path to take), but rather decision-aiding
by providing data digestion, or autonomous report
generation. The SUAS itself should create logs showing
the readings throughout the flight and match them
with the robot’s telemetry data in order to enable the
responders (or software agents) to better filter potential
points of interest. Post-processing intelligence was
needed to act on the digested data and identify the highest
readings, and to generate geographically based synopses
of key readings and imagery to help the decision makers
better understand the information gathered.
7. SUMMARY
Radiological response is representative of applications
where small unmanned systems will be required to fly
at low altitudes and in close proximity to structures. A
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discovery experiment was conducted with two SUASs,
a single rotor Leptron Avenger, and an AirRobot 100B
quadrotor, at a simulated building collapse atDisaster
City R _ with a “hot” radiation source in order to
ascertain autonomous capabilities that would facilitate
adoption by responders. Acognitive work analysis of
the data collected was conducted, and it was found that
all three of the propositions motivating the experiment
were correct:
· SUASs can conduct an initial assessment and a radiological survey faster than a manual team; the data
show that the SUAS started providing useful data in
16 min and it reached command within 50 min after
arrival, 10 min before the responders would have even
been fully ready in Level A suits. In addition to being
faster, SUASs can reduce or eliminate responder exposure to radiation and reduce the number of responders needed to carry out missions from six to three.
· Vehicle and navigational autonomy will be challenging due to low altitudes and proximity to urban
structures. Low altitudes (0.3–40 m) and close proximity to structures (1.5 m) are necessary to detect and
localize a leaking radiation source such as might be
found in a nuclear medicine ward. A rubble pile with
a suspected radiation source may require contour following of 1.5 m. These extreme altitudes and proximity are because radiation strength decreases with the
square of distance, so the SUAS must get as close as
possible. In the experiment, the radiation source was
on the first floor of a two-story commercial building,
representing a worst case for a SUAS. While GPS was
not lost, GPS coverage decreased by almost half, and
if the pilot had not been actively engaged in supervision of the platform, a crash could have resulted. The
experiment also indicated that unmodeled obstacles
not appearing on a map or satellite image can pose
major problems.
· The data-to-decision (D2D) process did experience
bottlenecks that mission autonomous capabilities can
overcome. The manual D2D process has a responder
report any significant findings over the radio after
the team returns with the data and then transports
the complete dataset via a courier. A SUAS fits this
process without creating bottlenecks. However,
its ability to record video and still imagery along
with the radiological readings offers a richer raw
dataset. Though these data arrive at the same time,
or earlier because of the faster start, they are not in a
digested form that can be readily used by the incident
commander, and they were not looked at. Perhaps
the major lesson from the discovery experiment is
that autonomous capabilities should be designed to
augment, not replace, the human pilot and mission
specialist capabilities in these harsh environments
while protecting the vehicle from harm and to aid
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rapid, accurate decision making. Five autonomous
navigational capabilities were identified with
immediate import: scan, obstacle avoidance, contour
following, environment-aware return to home, and
return to highest reading. Two of these, obstacle
avoidance and environment-aware return to home,
should be valuable for any near earth, low altitude
application.
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